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"The Big Chill": Business Use of the Tort
of Defamation To Discourage the
Exercise of First Amendment Rights
By SHARLENE A. McEvoy*
Although first amendment rights are among the most cherished of
those guaranteed by our Bill of Rights, in some cases the exercise of the
freedoms of speech and of petition has been interdicted by lawsuits that
discourage their exercise. This has happened in recent years when devel-
opers have brought lawsuits sounding in defamation against individuals
and civic associations. While many of these actions fail at the earliest
stages of the civil process, they have the effect of chilling public participa-
tion. This Article will discuss several of these cases and possible reme-
dies to discourage such lawsuits.
The late 1970s and 1980s saw an unprecedented building boom in
many parts of the United States. This building frenzy affected not only
commercial development, but also residential areas due to zoning
changes, special exceptions, and variances granted by compliant local of-
ficials. In many cases, these proposed developmients-commercial and
condominium-affected residential neighborhoods.
A lawsuit no doubt may be used ... as a powerful instrument
of coercion or retaliation.... Regardless of how unmeritorious the
... suit is, the [defendant] will most likely have to retain counsel
and incur substantial legal expenses to defend against it. Further-
more, ... the chilling effect upon [a defendant's] willingness to
engage in protected activity is multiplied where the complaint
seeks damages in addition to injunctive relief.'
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, Fairfield University, Fairfield, Connecticut;
Practicing Attorney; B.A., Albertus Magnus College; M.A., Trinity College; J.D., University
of Connecticut School of Law; Ph.D., University of California at Los Angeles. The author
wishes to acknowledge the kind assistance of Donna Gallo, Betty Blake, Martha Wise, Attor-
neys Harriette K. Dorsen, Richard Hamburger, George Nager, William Cohn, and Henry R.
Kaufman, and Representatives Robert J. Gaffney (N.Y.) and Richard Tulisano (Conn.) in the
preparation of this Article. The project was sponsored by Fairfield University, School of Busi-
ness Summer Research Grant, 1989.
1. Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 740-41 (1983) (citations
omitted) (addressing such suits in the context of employer-employee relations).
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Lisa Mackey, a Valley Stream, New York, resident, was slapped
with a $3 million libel suit for circulating fliers that called a local devel-
oper "greedy."
2
Betty Blake, a New York homemaker, was sued for $6.5 million for
trying to stop a developer from knocking down trees and building two
houses on her street.3
Elaine Capobianco, also of New York, was sued for $1 million when
she fought the builder of a twenty-one unit townhouse project.4
The private citizens described above stepped forward to oppose the
influx of condominium and office buildings that encroached on their
neighborhoods and threatened to change their characters forever. In
many similar cases, the residents mounted unsophisticated informational
public relations and lobbying campaigns designed to thwart the machina-
tions of developers.5 As a result, these individuals or groups sometimes
found themselves the defendants in defamation lawsuits brought by de-
velopers. Developers have also asserted other causes of action including:
1) interference with advantageous relations;6 2) malicious interference
with contract rights;7 3) abuse of process;8 and 4) violation of civil rights
2. Boccella, Expensive Free Speech," NEWSDAY, Mar. 18, 1988, at 3.
3. I.
4. Id
5. Residents are becoming more sophisticated. For example, an article in a recent issue
of the New York Times began: "Neighborhood groups allied with environmental organizations
are mounting sophisticated new campaigns to influence planning and real estate development
across New York City. Groups have sprung up in almost every Manhattan neighborhood and
in many parts of other boroughs." Lueck, Citizens Gain in Anti-Developer Wars, N.Y. Times,
May 14, 1989, Home Section, at 1.
6. Carr v. Brown, 395 A.2d 79 (D.C. 1978) (real estate developer brought an action
alleging that a property owner and his attorney maliciously interfered with his development
project); Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (Humboldt Fir, Inc. filed an
action against Sierra Club, alleging that it sought to induce the United States to breach a
contract that allowed the Company to harvest timber. The Court held that "nothing more was
alleged than that Sierra Club intentionally exercised its constitutional right to petition the
government....").
7. Great Western Cities v. Binstein, 476 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. IM. 1979); aff'd, 614 F.2d
775 (7th Cir. 1979) (land development corporation unsuccessfully sued an association of alleg-
edly defrauded lot owners).
8. Protect Our Mountain Environment, Inc. v. District Court, 677 P.2d 1361 (Colo.
1984) (environmental group sued by a developer for opposing the rezoning of a 507 acre tract
from "Agricultural Two" to "Planned Development," which caused delays and increased fi-
nancing and construction costs); Anchorage Joint Venture v. Anchorage Condominium Asso-
ciation, 670 P.2d 1249 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983) (AJV sought a variance to allow construction of a
condominium complex on an irregularly shaped parcel of land. The Association opposed the
project, so AJV sued, seeking damages resulting from a delay in the project that caused an
increase in legal fees and interest on an outstanding debt.).
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under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 9
This nation prides itself on free speech. The United States Supreme
Court has held that "the rights to assemble peaceably and to petition for
a redress of grievances are among the most precious of liberties safe-
guarded by the Bill of Rights.""0 But this statement is cold comfort to
anyone who has become a defendant in the labyrinthine processes of the
civil lawsuits described in this Article.
Although most observers agree "that the probability of an adverse
judgment is small,"" the price of civil involvement can be very high, not
only in terms of attorney's fees and general litigation expenses, but also
through the disruption of families, physical illness and emotional up-
heaval. 2 Such protracted vexation can have the effect of discouraging
even the hardiest souls from exercising their first amendment rights. In
short, the cases discussed in this Article have been dubbed "nuisance"
suits. Plaintiffs file such suits to obtain positive results from the defend-
ants, even though both parties realize that the plaintiffs' cases are so
9. Lange v. Nature Conservancy, Inc., 24 Wash. App. 416, 601 P.2d 963 (1979) (Land-
owner brought an action against a non-profit environmental organization, which was in the
process of listing 75 potentially significant nature areas including Lange's property. The court
found no conspiracy to deprive Lange of his property); Weiss v. Willow Tree Civic Associa-
tion, 467 F. Supp. 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (Plaintiffs purchased underdeveloped land with the
intent to build a planned development, which was opposed by Willow Tree Civil Association
because of drainage and sewage problems. The court rejected plaintiff's civil rights claim as
far-fetched because civic association was not part of the government.); Gorman Towers, Inc. v.
Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1980) (Developer planned to build an apartment complex
on a parcel zoned for multi-family housing units. The area residents petitioned the planning
commission and board of directors to rezone the land for single family duplexes. The court
held that the residents' attempt to prevent the construction of the complex by demanding a
zoning amendment and by spreading derogatory and false statements about the proposal were
absolutely privileged activities immune to an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.); Bell v. Mazza,
394 Mass. 1974, 474 N.E.2d 1111 (1985) (Bell brought state and federal civil rights actions
against several neighbors, alleging that the neighbors had conspired to prevent the landowner
from constructing a tennis court on his property, which abutted wetlands.); Miller and Sons
Paving v. Wrightown, 443 F. Supp. 1268 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (Plaintiff argued that local civic
associations conspired in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Civil Rights Act by
filing an appeal with the Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board from the Board's grant
of a permit to plaintiff to surface mine and drain. The court dismissed the complaint because
the defendant associations' activities were not of the type that the Sherman Act and Civil
Rights Act were designed to prohibit.).
10. United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Association, 384 U.S. 217, 222 (1967).
11. Sive, Countersuits, Delay, Intimidation Caused by Public Interest Suits, Nat'l L.J.,
June 19, 1989, at 27, col. 1.
12. Pring and Canan, Intimidation Suits Against Citizens: A Risk for Public Policy Advo-
cates, at 16 (1986) (unpublished article) (courtesy of authors). One woman interviewed for this
Article said, "I don't want to talk about it. It's disgusting. Small people don't count." Inter-
view, name withheld (Oct. 28, 1989).
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weak that they will be unlikely to pursue the cases to trial or to win. 3
The plaintiff in these cases has the advantage. By filing a claim,
even a plaintiff with a weak case forces the defendants to defend them-
selves or be held liable for a full judgment.' 4 Such a lawsuit inevitably
will be expensive, and few individuals or public interest groups will have
the resources to fight on two fronts: in the political arena and in the
courts. As one lawyer characterized the situation:
There is no question that lawsuits can intimidate. Certain it is [sic]
that lawsuits that expose ordinary citizens with multi-million dol-
lar claims for alleged damage, more than intimidate, they freeze
the blood cold and "thus do make cowards of us all." . . . Few
average citizens have the wherewithall [sic] to defend themselves
against the armoire of monies expended by well-monied personsb]
companies, [and] corporations-who not only may have the means
to mount suits, but can claim further tax advantages for the legal
expenses involved. Not so the poor defendants, the citizens who
face this might .... 15
By bringing a lawsuit, the developers succeed in moving the battle
from the political arena, where it belongs, to the courthouse, where they
hold the advantage because they have more money. Moreover, the stakes
are smaller in each individual case. Over time, developers will become
"repeat players" in subsequent cases and powerful adversaries: larger,
richer and more savvy than their opponents.
16
Individual homeowners or small neighborhood groups may be char-
acterized as one-shot defendants who have little taste for litigation. By
initiating any type of legal proceeding, developers place the homeowners
or civic groups at a great disadvantage.
Still these developers, as plaintiffs, may have legitimate complaints.
Many developers who have sued for defamation have claimed that exces-
sive criticism and delays have wreaked havoc on their projects. They
contend that they have a right to defend against malicious attacks and
protracted delays in their plans, which may lead to bankruptcy. As one
developer, the object of a civic association protest, stated, "We nearly
went bankrupt. People have a perception that anybody out there build-
13. Rosenberg and Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance
Value, 5 INTER. REV. OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 3, 3 (1985). In an interview with the author,
William Cohn, a lawyer for a plaintiff in a pending case, was asked if he expected to win.
"Realistically, no," was his reply. Interview with William Cohn, in Baldwin, New York (Oct.
19, 1989).
14. 5 INT'L. REV. OF LAW AND EcON. at 3.
15. Notice of Motion to Amend Answer, Terra Homes, Inc. v. Blake, Index No. 1563/88,
at 3 (George Nager, attorney for defendants).
16. Galanter, Why The "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, LAW AND Soc'Y, Fall 1974, 98-100.
ing is a multi-millionaire. That's not true."1 7
The first Part of this Article will analyze cases that were based on
the theory of defamation and their outcomes. The second Part will rec-
ommend steps the courts and the legislatures may take to discourage
these nuisance suits that "put a quiet chill on the First Amendment."' 8
I. The Defamation Cases
Of the important cases in which the plaintiffs used defamation as a
weapon against the opponents of their development projects,19 Okun v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles County,2" Walters v. Linhof,21 Karnell v.
Campbell,22 SR W v. Bellport Beach Property Owners,2" and Myers v. Plan
Takoma Inc.24 have the most similar facts and outcomes. Defamation
was also used as a weapon in Sherrard v. Hull
25 and Webb v. Fury,26
where the courts recognized the "sham exception" doctrine.
A. The Okun Line of Cases
The Okun case is perhaps the most typical of the defamation cases.
A group of concerned citizens organized a successful campaign to repeal
a city ordinance that would have allowed condominium development on
a choice ten-acre site in Beverly Hills, California.2 7 In the course of their
17. Boccella, Expensive Free Speech, NEWSDAY, Mar. 14, 1988, at 19.
18. Interview with Attorney George Nager, in Wantaugh, New York (Oct. 16, 1989).
19. In some cases, developers have by-passed individuals and associations, instead suing
the news organization for publishing an allegedly defamatory statement made by citizens. The
United States Supreme Court decided such a case in Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Assoc. v.
Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970). In Greenbelt, a real estate developer, Bresler, was engaged in nego-
tiations with the City Council of Greenbelt for a zoning variance that would have allowed him
to build high density housing on his land. The city concurrently was trying to acquire another
tract of land from Bresler to construct a high school. Both sides had bargaining leverage in the
negotiations. The defendant newspaper accurately reported the debate at the City Council
meeting in which residents denounced Bresler's negotiating tactics as "blackmail." Bresler
sued, alleging that the article imputed a crime to him. The Supreme Court held, as a matter of
constitutional law, that the word "blackmail" was in these circumstances not libel, but a "rhe-
torical hyperbole" or "vigorous epithet." Id at 14. The Court concluded that the context in
which the words appeared was such that no one reading it would believe that Bresler was
charged with a crime. See also Diamond v. American Family Corp., 186 Ga. App. 681, 368
S.E.2d 350 (1988); Riley v. Moyed, 529 A.2d 248 (Del. 1987); Goodrich v. Waterbury Repub-
lican-American, Inc., 188 Conn. 107, 448 A.2d 1317 (1982).
20. 29 Cal. 3d 442, 629 P.2d 1369, 175 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1981).
21. 559 F. Supp. 1231 (D. Colo. 1983).
22. 206 N.J. Supir. 81, 501 A.2d 1029 (1985).
23. 129 A.D.2d 328, 517 N.Y.S.2d 741 (1987).
24. 472 A.2d 44 (D.C. 1983).
25. 53 Md. App. 553, 456 A.2d 59 (1983).
26. 167 W.Va. 434, 282 S.E.2d 28 (1981).
27. 29 Cal. 3d 442, 447-48, 629 P.2d 1369, 1372, 175 Cal. Rptr. 157, 160 (1981).
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lobbying efforts, citizens wrote letters and made statements accusing a
real estate developer, both directly and indirectly, of a corrupt relation-
ship with city officials, enabling him to "buy" the right to develop condo-
miniums.2" The developer had in fact discussed with city officials the
possibility of a "land exchange," so that he and the city would each own
adjoining land.
These negotiations concluded successfully on November 28, 1978,
when the city council agreed to the swap and adopted a zoning ordinance
allowing the plaintiff to build its condominiums.29
To prevent the construction, the defendants circulated and filed a
petition to allow voters to accept or reject the ordinance. As a result, the
city council placed the ordinance on the ballot for a vote held on March
9, 1979. The voters rejected the ordinance and it was repealed.
The developer brought suit, complaining that the defendants were
motivated by ill-will toward him. He alleged that the campaign against
the ordinance defamed him because the defendants falsely accused him of
corrupt activities in collusion with city officials.3 0 One of the three Bev-
erly Hills Council members was a real estate developer who was obvi-
ously sympathetic to fellow builders and realtors, although he had no
business interests in the city.
The plaintiff also objected to the contents of a letter written by the
defendants to the Los Angeles Times and an open letter to the Mayor of
Beverly Hills published in the Beverly Hills Courant. In the Times letter,
the defendants pejoratively referred to the plaintiff as a "developer" and
implied that Councilman Stone and other City Council members were
motivated by a selfish interest rather than by the public good.31
The plaintiff further objected to the fact that the letter entitled "To
Set The Record Straight" contained words like "mysteriously" and
"amazingly" in the penultimate paragraph. Thus, the writers suggested
knowledge of unstated or inappropriate behavior between the plaintiff
and Stone.32
The plaintiff also alleged that the last six paragraphs in the open
letter to the Mayor that appeared in the Beverly Hills Courant on Octo-
ber 13, 1978, were libelous. These paragraphs, however, were taken from
a John D. MacDonald novel, Condominium, which concerned a fictional
28. Myers v. Plan Takoma, Inc., 472 A.2d 44, 49 (D.C. 1983) (summarizing the facts in
Okun v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 442, 629 P.2d 1369, 175 Cal. Rptr. 157).
29. 29 Cal. 3d at 448, 629 P.2d at 1372, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
30. Id. at 448, 629 P.2d at 1371, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
31. Id. at 451, 629 P.2d at 1374, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 163.
32. Id at 451, 629 P.2d at 1374, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 163.
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Florida company that bribed public officials and engaged in other illegal
activities in order to construct defective buildings.
33
The California Supreme Court held that both letters were state-
ments of opinion protected by the First Amendment. The court noted
that the statements were part of a debate over whether the city should
permit the plaintiff's condominium project, a setting in which an audi-
ence "may anticipate efforts... to persuade ... by use of epithets, fiery
rhetoric or hyperbole."34
Regarding the Times letter, the Court determined that the plaintiff's
claimed innuendo and allegations were not supported by words in the
letter because "it did not constitute libelous charges of bribery and cor-
ruption."3 The court concluded that:
[t]he implications deprecatory to plaintiff are mere opinions, not
libelous. An essential element of libel is that the publication in
question must contain a false statement of fact... . .This require-
ment.., is constitutionally based. The reason for the rule, well
stated by the high court is [as follows:] "Under the First Amend-
ment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an
opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the con-
science of judges and juries but on the competition of other
ideas.")
36
Nor did the Okun court believe that the open letter to the Mayor
comparing the actions of the developer and city council members to
those in a novel could be fairly read as charging bribery or any other
crimes.37
Moreover, the court found that statements in a handbill opposing
the ordinance allowing the condominium construction could not reason-
ably be interpreted by readers as libelous. Even the statement that the
developer entered into a corrupt relationship with a councilman was
more an expression of opinion than an actual accusation of a crime.38
Two aspects of this decision are particularly noteworthy. First,
short of a criminal accusation or personal dishonesty, the First Amend-
ment protects even sharp attack on a person's motive or the moral quali-
fications of public officials. Second, there is also leeway for criticism of
an individual who voluntarily injects himself into public controversy,
33. Id. at 453, 629 P.2d at 1376, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
34. Id. at 459, 629 P.2d at 1379, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 167 (citation omitted).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 450, 629 P.2d at 1374, 175 Ca. Rptr. at 162 (citing Gregory v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp, 17 Cal. 3d 596, 552 P.2d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1976), quoting Gertz v.
Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974)).
37. Ird. at 453, 629 P.2d at 1376, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
38. Id. at 457-59, 629 P.2d at 1378-79, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 166-67.
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thus becoming a public figure. The court accepted the notion that the
developer's participation in a land exchange with the city and the adop-
tion of a zoning ordinance allowing his development made him a public
figure for defamation purposes.
39
A few years later, a libel claim was used as a weapon in Walters v.
Linhof.4 Walters, a developer, brought a suit against Eric Linhof and
others, alleging defamation based on their statements in letters to the
county land use department, county officials, and editors of the local
newspaper.
4 1
Walters sought recommendations and approvals from Colorado
county agencies and from the Board of County Commissioners for a con-
struction project near Monument, Colorado. These approvals would
have granted requests for rezoning. Linhof objected to the developer's
plans in a variety of communications.4 2
On November 9, 1981, Linhof sent a letter to the El Paso County
Land Use Department that referred to Walters as an options speculator
posing as a developer, stating:
This application for a massive re-zoning of what is mostly
pristine grazing land calls into question the usefulness of the whole
Land Use Planning apparatus. Is it of any use? Or is it sterile,
merely based on noble sentiments, such as local citizens['] partici-
pation in guiding their future, and on golden words about appro-
priate use of the land? Can it stand the test? The test is whether a
developer, even a land options speculator posing as a developer, in
fact overrides the land use planning process and the citizens and
their desires. Does the developer, or a purported developer, simply
sweep it all aside when he spends enough money to put together a
comprehensive brochure? The result is permanent, irreversible.
Does the developer in reality govern the result?43
The El Paso County Land Use Department is the primary object of
this diatribe, not Walters. But Linhof went on to say:
Further, we have reason to urge that the County Commissioners
examine thoroughly the financial capability and technical knowl-
edge of this developer to finance this project and see it through to
completion as proposed. His own resume shows that he has had
no experience in developing and completing a project of this
nature.44
39. I&. at 451, 629 P.2d at 1374, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 162.
40. 559 F. Supp. 1231 (D. Colo. 1983).
41. Id. at 1233.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1235.
44. Id. at 1236.
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Walters also alleged that a letter to the editor of the Monument
Tribune by another defendant, Woodruff, was defamatory. Woodruff's
letter recited her concern for the community, her involvement in the re-
zoning proposal, and her attendance at numerous meetings. She then
added:
I was shocked to learn that many of the California towns where
Walters claims to have had experience were very familiar to me.
My thoughts wandered to overbuilt and crowded subdivisions,
rundown and vacant shopping centers and industrial complexes
which are real eye-sores.
Woodruff's letter continued its denunciation of Walters, questioning
his experience and qualifications and outlining the research she had done
on him in California.'
Walters also claimed a letter that was circulated by the defendants
to various public officials in El Paso County was defamatory. This letter,
written by Robert Cruise, allegedly contained untrue statements about
Walters and was accompanied by a photograph of Walters' California
headquarters. This latter claim perplexed the court, which said, "The
exact nature of the statements in the letter or whether the photograph
was in fact a photograph of the plaintiff's headquarters is not
articulated."47
The defendant moved for summary judgment. The court held that,
like the developer in Okun, Walter's participation in the rezoning pro-
ceeding was sufficient to qualify him as a public figure. Even if Walters
did not expressly consent to the public comment, he was deemed to have
constructively consented by virtue of his rezoning applications. The
plaintiff's constructive consent barred recovery for statements that, even
if defamatory, were made in response to requests by the Board of County
Commissioners for comment and public participation. Therefore, even if
defamatory, the defendants' communications were absolutely privileged.
The court also found, as a matter of law, that the statements contained in
the letters to the Land Use Department and the local newspaper were
protected.4"
Unlike Okun, the district court in this case discussed at length the
issue of the developer as a public figure. The plaintiff, Walters, argued
that he was not a public figure even though he was the proponent of a
zoning change that invited public attention and comment. The plaintiff
conceded that he may have invited public comment, but not abuse in
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1233.
48. Id. at 1236-37.
Sarin 199D] THE BIG CHILL
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
print.49 The court acknowledged that Walters was not a public figure for
all purposes because he did not "occupy a position having persuasive
power and influence."5 The court went on to find that Walters' and his
associates':
[p]articipation in the re-zoning proceeding was significant enough
to qualify them as public figures. One does not become a public
figure simply because the media's attention was attracted, but
plaintiffs here thrust themselves to the forefront of a particular
public controversy to affect its resolution.51
Writing letters to the editor created problems similar to those in
Okun and Walters in a 1985 New Jersey case, Karnell v. Campbell.2
Robert L. and Wayne L. Karnell, doing business as a real estate develop-
ment firm named Central Leasing Company, purchased a vacant lot near
the former New Market school, which they planned to develop into retail
stores. The plan drew much criticism, not only concerning the develop-
ment of the land, but also for an alleged underappraisal of the vacant lot
which led to its being undervalued for sale to the Karnells.53
Among the critics were the defendants, Rita Campbell, John Penna,
Carrollee Rosenblatt, and Eileen Wolfskehl, who, the Karnells alleged,
had maliciously written letters containing false and defamatory state-
ments about them that were published in the P.D. Review, a local news-
paper.54 Rosenblatt wrote a letter that appeared in the newspaper on
December 16, 1982, stating that, on December 8, 1982, Piscataway had
been "raped" because the town had been "stupid enough" to trust the
Karnells and rezone New Market with resulting disadvantage to the resi-
dents. The letter further stated that the town had been "robbed" because
undeveloped commercial land could sell for $200,000, and the price paid
for the New Market property with its structure and improvement
"amounts to theft." She voiced the hope that Piscataway would fight the
planned alteration and void the zoning change "obtained by the devel-
oper under false pretenses." She characterized the town as being not a
rape victim, but a "cheap prostitute" if it did not fight the developers.55
John Penna wrote a lengthy letter to the newspaper which expressed
his distrust of the town Planning Board. He criticized the Board for
allowing the Karnells' plan to pave over the grassland and develop the
49. Id. at 1235.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1235 (citations omitted).
52. 206 N.J. Super. 81, 501 A.2d 1029 (1985).
53. Id. at 85, 501 A.2d at 1031.
54. Id. at 85, 501 A.2d at 1030-31.
55. Id. at 85-86, 501 A.2d at 1031.
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New Market property into another shopping center. Penna opined that
the development would cause traffic jams, air pollution and storm sewer
overload.56 Penna wrote that Piscataway and New Market had been
"duped by the clever maneuvering of very shrewd businessmen,"57 Ac-
cording to Penna, "[a]llowing the Karnell group the right to build retail
stores on our grassland only serves to fatten the Karnell bank account (I
can see the smiles on their faces) while, once again, the New Market area
gets dumped on."5"
Eileen Wolfskehl also wrote a letter that appeared in the P.D. Re-
view. She not only criticized the Karnells' development plans, but also
the Planning Board that approved it despite public opposition. She com-
mented, "Mr. Karnell seems to have no difficulty in getting what he
wants, e.g. a variance to build more parking spaces." 59 Wolfskehl
claimed that she and other citizens had been misinformed by the plan-
ning board clerk who said that retail stores were not part of the Karnell's
project. She also questioned whether the Planning Board continued the
meeting late into the night so it could make its decision after many citi-
zens had left. Wolfskehl stated her belief that the Planning Board feared
there would be a greater turnout if another meeting were held.6
Of all the defendants, Rita Campbell wrote the lengthiest letter to
the P.D. Review, which was published on February 24, 1983. Her letter
stated in part:
At the Piscataway Township Council meeting of February 1,
Robert Karnell, purchaser of a 0.9-acre lot adjacent to the New
Market School, portrayed himself as a much put-upon man. He
said that he had been slandered and libeled and he attempted to
win sympathy by stating that his wife had been hospitalized for a
year and that he himself had had a heart attack and had also been
hospitalized. He said that he had been unaware of the restrictive
clause in the sale ordinance limiting use of the land to parking.
No one an (sic) believe that a developer who has purchased as
much land in Middlesex County as Mr. Karnell has could fail to be
aware of that restrictive clause. Moreover, he has a lawyer. In-
deed, a lawyer was sitting beside him at the meeting....
Does Mr. Karnell expect us to believe that he was not aware of
this grave error in the appraisal of which he got a copy and for which
he paid $300? Do you pay $300 for something and not look at it
carefully?




60. Id at 87, 501 A.2d at 1031-32.
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The whole matter raises many questions and I have com-
plained to the Middlesex County Prosecutor. At the council meet-
ing of February 15, Mr. Paley, township counsel, said that he did
not know how this error had occurred. Perhaps the prosecutor can
find out and whether it was, in fact, an error.
61
Before reaching its decision, the court analyzed the contents of all
the letters. The court viewed Wolfskehl's letter as not actionable because
it merely said that Robert Karnell had no trouble getting his develop-
ment plan approved by the town. The letter did not suggest that Karnell
got his way through dishonest or criminal behavior.62 Nor did the court
find Penna's letter defamatory although it suggested that the township
had been "duped" by Karnell's maneuvering. The court said, "In es-
sence Penna portrays plaintiffs as clever businessmen who are profiting at
the expense of the citizens .... We view this as pure opinion couched in
terms of pejorative rhetoric ....
The court was also satisfied that Rosenblatt's letter was "pure opin-
ion" and that she did not accuse the Karnells of the crimes of rape or
theft. The court had more trouble with her claim that the Karnells had
obtained a zoning change under "false pretenses." The plaintiffs had ar-
gued that this was not a protected expression of opinion, but a statement
charging them with dishonest conduct or at least an opinion based on
undisclosed facts.'
The court disagreed, stating that a "contextual reading of [her]
words leads only to the conclusion that her idea of an appropriate com-
mercial use for the New Market school property is different from
plaintiffs."
65
The court had the most difficulty with the Campbell letter because it
contained statements regarding Karnell's purchase of the property at a
low price because of an incorrect appraisal. 66 Her letter voiced disbelief
that Karnell paid for an appraisal and yet did not know that the land had
been rezoned and underappraised, and it expressed her dissatisfaction
with the town. Her incredulity about Karnell's testimony before the
61. Id. at 87, 501 A.2d at 1032 (emphasis added by court). On February 24, 1984, an
article in the P.D. Review, a local newspaper serving Piscataway and Dunellen, "reported that
the prosecutor was investigating Campbell's charge that after the New Market property was
rezoned for commercial use the Karnells purchased it at a' "dishonestly" low cost' because its
appraisal value had been 'deliberately underestimated' at $35,000 for the plaintiffs' gain." 206
N.J. Super. at 88, 501 A.2d at 1032.
62. Id at 92, 501 A.2d at 1035.
63. Id. at 92-93, 501 A.2d at 1035.
64. Id at 93, 501 A.2d at 1035.
65. Id.
66. Id.
Town Council led to her complaint to the county prosecutor.67 The
court concluded, however, that Campbell's statements were not defama-
tory because she disclosed all the facts which formed the basis of her
opinion.6S
Thus, the court found all of the letters to be protected speech, stat-
ing, "The citizens of our state must be free, within reason, to speak out
on matters of public concern. So long as they state the facts implicated
fairly and express their opinions, even in the most colorful and hyper-
bolic terms, their speech should be protected by us....
In the 1986 case of SR W Assocs. v. Bellport Beach Property Own-
ers,7" it was handbills, pamphlets, and board-hearing statements that
brought the defendants into court. SRW sought to build thirty-six clus-
tered condominiums on a bay-front site in New York. The Brookhaven
Town Board favored clustered development (apartment buildings, town
houses, or garden apartments), which was permitted, if approved, under
Brookhaven Town Law section 281 (no zone change required). Civic
associations and individuals, however, opposed this plan. They feared in-
creased noise, traffic, and sewage would change the character of their
neighborhood.71
A stormy public hearing on this project was held on October 3,
1984. The civic associations' pamphlet and radio advertisements de-
scribed the development as "multi-family condominium housing." Three
hundred angry, hostile people descended on a Town Board meeting to
voice concerns regarding changes in the community from family homes
on one-acre lots to a cluster-type development and the concomitant ef-
fects of such a change on sewers and water supplies.72
The elected Town Board officials agreed with the civic associations
and unanimously rejected the SRW plan. Subsequently, SRW brought
suit against nine civic associations and sixteen individuals for 11 million
dollars, alleging injurious falsehood over the manner in which the civic
associations protested its plan. SRW claimed that it was damaged be-
cause some residents incorrectly described its proposals to develop high
density housing as a plan to build condominiums! SRW complained that
this swayed public opinion, and encouraged the town board to turn down
67. Id. at 94, 501 A.2d at 1036.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 94-95, 501 A.2d at 1036.
70. 129 A.D.2d 328, 517 N.Y.S.2d 741 (1987).
71. Telephone interview with Donna Gallo, defendant in SRW Assoc. v. Bellport Beach
Property Owners (Oct. 19, 1989).
72. Id.
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the zoning SRW requested. 3
SRW's attorney, Frederick W. Block, said civic groups knew the
proposal was for single-family homes and deliberately misled the public
to induce the Town Board to kill the project. Block stated:
"They sent out circulars saying come down and oppose the
garden apartments. They packed the auditorium and the Town
Board was scared to death." The Town Board members... "were
afraid the 500 [sic] people there would vote them out of office, so
they acted like a political body is expected to act."'74
Attorney Block's statements gave rise to the prevailing feeling that
SRW had sought to punish the civic associations opposed to the plan by
bringing a lawsuit. The punishment might also intimidate local citizens
from speaking out in the future.75 This inference of SRW's purpose was
borne out by Block's statements:
"We'll test the waters with this case .... Where is the line
going to be drawn? They want to put the white hat on the heads of
the civic leaders under the banner of the First Amendment, but it's
my clients who should be wearing the white hat. My clients were
ready to comply with what the Planning Board unanimously ap-
proved, but all that was rejected in favor of rallying behind the
forces."'76
Richard Hamburger, another lawyer for SRW, said his plaintiff
viewed the case as a "business tort." The product was housing and false
information killed the sale. He commented that his client "was mad and
had a right to be angry because the tumultuous hearing had denied SRW
the opportunity to be fairly heard. ' 77 The defendants not only answered
the complaint, but also filed a counterclaim charging SRW with an at-
tempt to misuse the legal process to intimidate defendants from exercis-
ing their first amendment rights.78 The defendants also asked the Court
to dismiss the complaint. In their motion, the defendants argued that the
First Amendment clearly protected the expression of their views in a
public forum. They contended that "such speech is at the heart of this
country's commitment to a democratic form of government and cannot
be punished in a civil action for libel."7 9
73. Id
74. Ketcham, Libel Suit: Tool Against Activism, N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1985, § 11 (LI), at
10, col. 3.
75. Press Release South County Alliance, Dec. 14, 1984, at 2 (courtesy Donna Gallo).
76. Ketcham, supra note 74.
77. Telephone interview with Richard Hamburger, attorney for plaintiff, SRW Assocs. v.
Bellport Beach Property Owners (Oct. 23, 1989).
78. Press Release of South County Alliance, supra note 75.
79. Suffolk Life, Dec. 19, 1984. Defense attorney Harriette K. Dorsen relied on
Blackhawk Corp. v. Ewing, 94 Cal. App. 3d 640, 156 Cal. Rptr. 581 (1979), in which the court
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The New York Supreme Court refused to grant the defense motion
to dismiss but dismissed the counterclaim by the civic groups that would
have charged the developer for costs incurred by the civic groups during
the case.30
The New York Appellate Division disagreed with the lower court.
The appellate court held, as a matter of law, that there was no causation
between the defendants' alleged misrepresentation to the members of the
public prior to the hearing and the Town Board's denial of SRW's
application.
The minutes of the public hearing on the plaintiffs application...
undisputedly show that the plaintiff's subdivision proposal for
cluster zoning of detached single-family residences was accurately
represented to the Town Board and to the members of the public
who attended the hearing by an attorney and architect retained by
the plaintiffil8
The court concluded that the direct cause of the plaintiff's injury
was the Town Board's decision to deny the application, not citizen com-
ments at the hearing.8 2 The court also stated that malice was not the sole
motivating factor because the neighbors merely wanted to protect their
neighborhood from perceived detrimental changes.
SR WAssocs. emphasized the rule on damage recovery in defamation
actions. In order "to recover damages for injurious falsehood, special
damages must be proved to be the direct and natural result of the
falsehood." 3
The defendants claimed a victory although it must be regarded as
Pyrrhic.8 4 The court did not rule that citizens had an unlimited right to
speak, but that in order to establish tort liability, the plaintiff must show
found statements made by a civic association in connection with the circulation of referendum
petitions were not defamatory because they did not impugn the developer's honesty or accuse
the developer of a crime. The court determined that the statements were addressed to the
electorate and concerned a matter of intense public interest. 94 Cal. App. 2d at 643, 156 Cal.
Rptr. at 583.
80. Telephone interview with Donna Gallo, supra note 71.
81. 129 A.D.2d 328, 331, 517 N.Y.S.2d 741, 743 (1987).
82. Id. at 332, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 744. Subsequently, SRW Associates filed a lawsuit against
the Brookhaven Town Board, which eventually overturned the Board's denial of permission
for the project. Telephone interview with Richard Hamburger, supra note 77.
83. Id. at 331, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 743.
84. The legal fee in the defendant's protracted victory reached nearly $18,000, a fraction
of which was covered by one defendant's automobile insurance policy. The rest was raised by
local contributions, fund-raising breakfasts, and other local efforts. The defendants' attorney
was Harriette K. Dorsen of New York City, who performed some work in the case pro bono.
The civic association and the individuals were reluctant to hire local attorneys closely associ-
ated with Suffolk County politics. They "thought it best to go into the city." Telephone inter-
view with Donna Gallo, supra note 71.
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that the defendants acted maliciously.85
SRW's lawyer, Hamburger, said of the unanimous ruling:
It's a license to lie. It's very disturbing. It says that a civic
association or anyone can say anything[;] so long as there is a hear-
ing and the applicant is represented, there can be no claim for dam-
ages. The action of the Board or public body breaks the causal
connection. 6
Despite the defendants' victory, both attorney Hamburger and the
author of this Article predict that the "case will come" in which a plain-
tiff will be successful.
87
Finally, in Myers v. Plan Takoma, Inc.,8 a neighborhood associa-
tion and various individuals were targets of a libel suit. Myers, Poling,
and Miller, operators of a neighborhood bar, sued a group called Plan
Takoma, Inc., a neighborhood association. The plaintiffs asserted that a
statement made in an association leaflet was defamatory.89
Plan Takoma, Inc. had stated in its leaflet that the plaintiffs were a
"shady group of bar owners."90 This circular was part of an effort to
influence the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board to deny the plaintiffs a
license to operate a bar or restaurant in the defendant's neighborhood.91
The plaintiffs argued that the word "shady" implied dishonesty and
illicit activities, and was an actionable defamatory statement.92 The asso-
ciation filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the
statement was not capable of a defamatory meaning and, as a statement
of opinion, was protected by the First Amendment.93
The court first embarked on a lengthy analysis of the leaflet, focus-
ing on the use of the term "shady." The court recognized that the term
might be considered an "offensive epithet in another context," but in this
situation it was unlikely that any reader would have taken it as other
than "rhetorical hyperbole." 94 The court noted, as did the Karnell court
with respect to Rosenblatt's letter, that the statement did not rely on the
existence of undisclosed defamatory facts or any privately held
information.
95
85. SRWAssocs., 129 A.D.2d at 332, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 744.
86. Ketcham, Libel Suit Dismissed, Long Island Journal, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1987, at 5.
87. Interview with Richard Hamburger, supra note 77.
88. 472 A.2d 44 (D.C. 1983).





94. Id at 48.
95. Id
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Next, the court analyzed whether the term "shady" was an opinion
or a fact that could be proved true or false. The court stated, "If the
content of the term used is so debatable, loose and varying, that [the
terms] are insusceptible to proof of truth or falsity, the use of the terms
will ordinarily be held to be within the realm of protected opinion."96
The court accordingly viewed "shady" as not susceptible to being proved
true or false and not a term that charges serious, criminal conduct. 97
The court termed the use of "shady" as an erroneous opinion, stat-
ing that such opinions "are inevitably put forward in free debate but even
erroneous opinion must be protected so that debate on public issues may
remain robust and unfettered .... 98
The court held that the bar owners had failed to state a claim be-
cause the so-called defamatory statement was a constitutionally pro-
tected statement of opinion. In reaching its holding, the court expressly
identified the most damaging aspect of these defamation cases as the
threat of prolonged litigation, which has the potential to chill those who
wish to criticize public figures or public affairs. 99 "[T]he prospect of de-
lay attendant upon any defamation trial, no matter how expeditiously
handled, may inhibit the full and free exercise of constitutionally pro-
tected activities.""
B. The "Sham Exception" Doctrine
Sometimes the plaintiff's use of a defamation claim can raise disqui-
eting issues as to whether the defendant's protest of the speech may be a
sham, which is a major exception to the first amendment right of peti-
tion. Two cases raised this specter: Sherrard v. Hull"'1 and Webb v.
Fury.
10 2
The Sherrard case involved a sixty-six year old woman, Edith Hull,
who, over the years, had participated in a variety of local political dis-
putes. Warwick Sherrard was a locally prominent businessman and oc-
casional politician in Cecil County, Maryland. At a hearing before a
Board of County Commissioners, Sherrard sought to change the zone of
some property located near Mrs. Hull's farm.103
96. Id. (citations.omitted).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 48 (citations omitted).
99. Id. at 50.
100. I
101. 53 Md. App. 553, 456 A.2d 59 (1983).
102. 167 W. Va. 434, 282 S.E.2d 28 (1981).
103. 53 Md. App. at 554, 456 A.2d at 60.
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Hull testified in opposition to the proposed zone change, but a week
later learned the Board granted Sherrard's rezoning application. Later
Hull appeared at an open Board meeting and gave her opinion on a vari-
ety of issues. In the course of her comments, she said to a county com-
missioner who had voted affirmatively for the Sherrard rezoning, "I
would like to know how much money it cost Warwick [Sherrard]." 1°
This exchange was recorded in the official minutes of the Board. Sher-
rard learned of Hull's comment and on May 23, 1980, filed a suit alleging
defamation. The jury found in favor of Hull and the Maryland Court of
Appeals upheld the jury's decision, saying, "Within this [case's] limited
factual framework, we hold that remarks made by an individual in the
course of petitioning for a redress of grievances before a legislative body
are absolutely privileged under the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution." 105
The Court noted that "[i]n order for a democratic government to
govern democratically, it is necessary that an atmosphere be created
whereby facts may be freely presented to the governing legislative
body."' 0 6 The Court believed Mrs. Hull's activities constituted petition-
ing and were protected from liability for defamation because she ap-
peared at a regular meeting of a legislative body with the power to
address her concerns.
10 7
Perhaps the most important aspect of the court's decision was the
court's statement that the petitioning privilege has its limits. In Judge
Alpert's words, "Inherent in the words 'petitioning for redress of griev-
ances' is the concept that the words contained in the petitioner will relate
to the redress sought and that the petition is genuinely seeking re-
dress."108 The judge's caveat concerns the one major exception to the
petitioning privilege: the so-called "sham exception," which removes
petitioning activity from the protection of the First Amendment.
The "sham exception" doctrine is drawn from two United States
Supreme Court cases: Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc."9 and United Mine Workers v. Pennington,110 which hold
104. Id. at 555, 456 A.2d at 61.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 558, 456 A.2d at 62.
107. Id. at 572, 456 A.2d at 70.
108. Id. at 574, 456 A.2d at 71.
109. 365 U.S. 127 (1961). Noerr interpreted the Sherman Antitrust Act as inapplicable to a
conspiracy by railroad presidents to foster the passage and enforcement of laws to destroy the
trucking business. But Noerr left open the possibility that the political processes may be so
abused that the efforts to influence the government are mere "shams" intended to cover an-
ticompetitive aims. Id. at 144.
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that coalitions intended to influence public officials do not violate the
Sherman Act.
In Sherrard, the Maryland Court of Appeals concluded that, in
Edith Hull's case, the "sham exception" would not apply because there
was not the slightest suggestion that Hull was a competitor or that she
was attempting to interfere with the business relationship of Sherrard.
As the Court put it, "so long as Hull's principal purpose... was to
obtain some favorable governmental action, any consequential injury to
Sherrard being merely incidental thereto, no defamation action may lie
for exercising her right to petition her local legislative body."
111
The issue of the "sham exception" also arose in Webb v. Fury, which
involved an environmental group sued by a coal company.I" On July 1,
1980, DLM Coal Corporation, a West Virginia Mining Company, filed a
libel action for $200,000 against Rick Webb, a farmer, the managing
agent of Braxton Environmental Action Program, Inc., and a member of
Mountain Stream Monitors. Braxton was a nonprofit West Virginia cor-
poration with the express purpose of "ensuring that coal development is
conducted with full regard for creation and the rights of future genera-
tions."1 1 ' Mountain Stream Monitors was an unincorporated association
concerned with the effects of coal mining on water quality. Webb,
Braxton, and Mountain Stream were also sued by DLM for damaging
DLM commercial interests with a series of petitions to the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency and the Office of Surface Mining (OSM), and by a
Mountain Stream newsletter. The defendants had alleged that DLM had
polluted the Buckhannon River, causing many trout to die. 
14
Webb and others complained to the OSM, which is required under
the Reclamation Act to conduct an inspection whenever any person pro-
vides information giving rise to a reasonable belief of a violation of the
Act. The person who provides the information may accompany federal
officials on the inspection." 5
110. 381 U.S. 657 (1965). The Pennington court discussed the scope of Noerr. Pennington
involved a suit brought against the United Mine Workers by certain coal companies alleging
that the defendants had lobbied the Secretary of Labor to obtain adjustments to the Tennessee
Valley Authority coal purchasing policy in order to drive small coal companies out of business.
The Supreme Court held that combinations intended to influence public officials do not violate
the Sherman Act, even though the intended result of such influence is to destroy competition.
.kd at 670.
111. 53 Md. App. at 566, 456 A.2d at 67.
112. 167 W. Va. 434, 282 S.E.2d 28 (1981).
113. Id. at 436, 282 S.E.2d at 31.
114. Id at 437-40, 282 S.E.2d at 31-33.
115. Id at 438, 282 S.E.2d at 31.
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Webb, two OSM inspectors, and DLM employees tested several
seeps in the area of DLM's operations. All the testings revealed that the
water contained acid or iron above the limits established by federal regu-
lations. Despite these facts, the OSM could not establish conclusively
that the water in the seeps was runoff from the area mined by DLM.
Consequently, OSM decided not to take any action against DLM. OSM
told both Webb and DLM of its decision and its reasons.
The four-page newsletter that DLM claimed was defamatory dis-
cussed the association's activities and provided information about such
matters as the levels of certain pollutants in streams.'
1 6
The newsletter and the separate communications with the federal
agencies constituted the entire defamation case. The defendants main-
tained that their activities were absolutely privileged under the right of
petition provided by the First Amendment.'17 DLM argued that the
communications were defamatory, and saw the case as "a simple matter
of a corporation trying to vindicate its reputation through the legal sys-
tem.""'  The issue of the "sham exception" became the central focus in
this case. The question was raised whether plaintiff Webb's request for
administrative and investigative aid was initiated to harass DLM, to in-
terfere with its relationship with the government regulatory authority, or
to destroy its business. 119
The West Virginia court stated that any conduct that prevents an-
other from participating in the policy-making function of government is
not protected by the right to petition the government. Thus, such con-
duct may give rise to a cause of action for damages. 20
The Webb court noted that DLM had never claimed it was denied
access to or was prevented from participating in the proceedings of fed-
eral agencies. In fact, the company had ample opportunity to participate
in the EPA and OSM investigations. The court emphasized that not only
were DLM employees present during the inspection of the seeps, but no
citation or adverse agency action had ensued.' 2 ' Moreover, DLM never
alleged that the defendants used politics or economics to encourage the
OSM to act in an illegal manner.
122
116. Id. at 440, 282 S.E.2d at 33. The only page of the newsletter incorporated in the
complaint was the first page, which contained an editorial and a map of the Buckhannon
River. A shaded area on the map contained permit numbers, designating DLM mines.
117. Id
118. Id. at 441, 282 S.E.2d at 33.
119. IA at 451-52, 282 S.E.2d at 39.
120. Id. at 452, 282 S.E.2d at 39.
121. Id.
122. Id at 453, 282 S.E.2d at 39.
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The court reached two conclusions in this case. First, as a number
of courts have stated, even proof of malicious intent or knowing falsity
does not defeat the first amendment right to petition. "[The] cases make
it clear that permitting proof of malicious, fraudulent or deceitful inten-
tion to overcome the right to petition would so discourage the exercise of
the right as to constitute an impermissible burden." '123 In Webb, the peti-
tion merely supplied information directly to the agency in an effort to get
DLM's permits revoked.
Second, the court held that the statements published in the newslet-
ter were absolutely privileged communications under the First Amend-
ment and article III, section 16 of the West Virginia Constitution.
124
1H. Preventing Defamation Cases
The seven primary cases discussed in this Article have a common
theme: businesses and real estate developers used defamation as a
weapon to discourage defendants' protests. In each case, the defendants
won.
Yet to defend such lawsuits is expensive. As Judge Neely, dissent-
ing in Webb v. Fury, observed, "[W]e have ordinary citizens who are
being sued by a well-financed corporation for activities which appear to
be not only constitutionally privileged but statutorily solicited and
welcomed." 2 '
In virtually all of these nuisance cases, the plaintiffs spent large
amounts of money on the litigation, while the defendants were hard-
pressed to find legal representation at all. With this inequity, there is an
enormous opportunity for the chilling of first amendment rights.
This Article proposes several judicial and legislative steps that can
be taken to discourage the filing of nuisance cases.
A. Judicial Remedies
Some judicial steps have already been taken. For instance, the Colo-
rado Supreme Court has adopted a number of rules that can interdict
such nuisance suits. By the first such rule, any motion to dismiss that
raises the issue of first amendment rights must be dealt with expedi-
tiously by the trial court. Second, the burden of proof on a motion to
dismiss must be shifted from the defendant to the plaintiff, who then
must show that the defendant's petitioning activities were not protected
123. Id at 454-55, 282 S.E.2d at 40.
124. Idk at 459, 282 S.E.2d at 43.
125. Id at 466, 282 S.E.2d at 46.
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by the First Amendment. Third, the trial court must apply a heightened
level of review to the plaintiff's proof.
126
The Colorado courts also have a policy of employing three substan-
tive tests to a motion to dismiss. First, the plaintiff must prove baseless-
ness, showing that the suit was devoid of reasonable factual support or
lacked any basis in law. The plaintiff must then show that the primary
purpose of the defendant's conduct was improper, seeking either to har-
ass the plaintiffs or to effect some improper purpose. Finally, the plaintiff
must prove that the defendant's conduct "had the capacity to adversely
affect a legal interest of the plaintiff."27
Judge Neely's proposals focus on the high cost of discovery and the
attendant legal fees, which may chill the exercise of first amendment
rights because available resources are grossly imbalanced. He suggests a
rule permitting the trial court to order the plaintiff to pay the defendant's
discovery costs in advance. If the plaintiff succeeded on the merits, the
payment would be refunded.12
If a plaintiff is able to get to trial on the merits but loses, Neely
would require without exception that the defendant be awarded the full
costs of defense. Such a remedy would permit the defendant to hire a
lawyer on a contingent fee basis, as plaintiffs hire counsel in tort
actions. 129
Under the current rule, the so-called American Rule, a victorious
party in a law suit is not entitled to recover the attorney fees expended in
gaining the favorable result. 13 0 Perhaps the most feasible solution to this
problem is to adopt the British system, under which the winner obtains
costs and fees from the loser. Similarly, if a defendant defends against a
plaintiff who then withdraws, the defendant, as the winning party, would
recover all defense costs. The defense would be cost-free, and the plain-
tiff would not gain a settlement, therefore not profiting at all by filing a
claim. Under this model, if the probability of prevailing is low, the plain-
tiff's litigation costs are likely to be high.' The British system thus
encourages the filing of only meritorious claims.
The chief vice of the American system, as exemplified in the cases
discussed in this Article, is the opportunity for businesses to force indi-
126. Pring and Canan, Litigation to 'Chill' Public-Interest Advocacy, at 11 (1986) (unpub-
lished manuscript).
127. Id. (emphasis added).
128. 167 W. Va. at 467-68, 282 S.E.2d at 47.
129. Id. at 468, 282 S.E.2d at 47.
130. Epstein, Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process-Don't Get Mad, Get Even,
Long Island Examiner, Feb. 17, 1989, at 27.
131. Rosenberg and Shavell, supra note 13, at 5.
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viduals to defend themselves at little cost to the business. In each case,
the plaintiff filed an action at relatively small expense claiming the de-
fendant was liable for all of the plaintiff's injuries.1
32
In the American justice system, the courts do not exercise much
control over the quality of claims, and only "patently frivolous ones" are
disallowed.133 Even this occurs only after the case has begun to wend its
way through the court system. The only gatekeepers are the lawyers.
But in this litigious society many lawyers are only too willing to press
claims, even those without genuine value.
If the defendant does not appear and defend, leaving the complaint
unchallenged, the plaintiff wins without. any further inquiry on the part
of the courts.134 Thus, to defeat any case, no matter how meritless or
unjust, the defendant must pay the expense of gathering evidence to de-
fend against all of the allegations made by the plaintiff. 35 The hapless
defendant is placed in a no-win situation.
To address these inequities, Judge Neely also urges that a punitive
rule apply after a trial in which the plaintiffs actually used the legal pro-
cess in a "despicable way" to oppress citizens who have legitimately exer-
cised first amendment rights. In such a case, the court should exercise its
equitable powers to impose costs against the plaintiff in excess of actual
loss from defending the case, in essence fining those who fie frivolous
cases. 136
B. Defendants' Options
There are some options that might be available to defendants. One
is to file a counterclaim for legal harassment. Unfortunately, the time
and cost of doing so only adds to the frustration of the original lawsuit.
In some cases, a countersuit is not a feasible alternative. In SR W
Assocs. v. Bellport Beach Property Owners, 37 New York state law did not
permit the defendant to countersue in a libel case. As one of the defend-
ants said, "[E]ven if we did countersue in such a situation, [the] chances
of being reimbursed are slim. We (the defendants) and civics (civic as-
sociations) would have to prove that SRW deliberately set out to hurt us
financially."
131
But in one current case, the defendants, undaunted by time and ex-
132. Id at 9.
133. Id. at 9-10.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 167 W. Va. 434, 468, 282 S.E.2d 28, 47 (1981).
137. 129 A.D.2d 328, 517 N.Y.S.2d 741, (1987).
138. Telephone interview with Donna Gallo, supra note 71.
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pense, did countersue the plaintiffs. In Terra Homes, Inc v. Blake,'39 a
developer announced plans to build two colonial houses in place of a
single-family house on an oversized lot it had purchased. Two of the
defendants, Betty Blake and Eva Bressack, viewed the proposed struc-
tures as out of character with the neighborhood."4
The defendants mounted a campaign against the construction of the
houses. They held candlelight vigils, tied red ribbons around their own
trees and on some of the trees on Terra Homes' property, and put up a
sign which bore the legend, "We will not be Terra-ized." The seven
neighbors who were sued had attended a July 20, 1987, meeting at the
Hempstead Town Hall.
1 41
The plaintiff's lawyer conceded that the defendants' pun "Terra-
ized" was a play on the name of the company, not the owner, Anthony
Citarilli. Nonetheless, the plaintiff and his lawyer sued Blake, Bressack,
and others for 6.5 million dollars, alleging harassment, libel, slander, loss
of business and trespass. 42
The plaintiff's lawyer, William Cohn, said:
They have gone far beyond the limits of lawful protest to the extent
that they have libeled my client with signs and damaged the repu-
tation of Terra Homes. In this day and age, calling someone a
terrorist, even by implication, is more than an expression of opin-
ion-it denotes something more sinister and harmful.143
The defendants countersued, alleging abuse of process and stating
their belief that the purpose of the Terra Homes suit was to intimidate
them and to deny their rights under the First Amendment and under
section 9 of the New York Constitution. Blake and Bressack expressed
their belief that Terra Homes used the judicial process "to chill or im-
pede debate and petition on issues of importance, whatever the degree, of
citizens participating in the process of government .... ."
In short, the developer had ulterior motives-seeking to prevent
Betty Blake from continuing her constitutionally protected activities and
harassing the defendant-to compel her to forego her constitutionally
139. This case has not yet been tried in a New York Supreme Court.
140. Interview with Betty Blake, defendant in Terra Homes v. Blake, in Wantaugh Woods,
New York (Oct. 13, 1989).
141. Shaman, Libel Suits: Protection or Intimidation, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1987, at 12.
142. Telephone interview with William Cohn, attorney for Terra Homes, Inc. (Oct. 19,
1989).
143. Libel Suits: Protection or Intimidation, supra note 141, at 12-13.
144. Terra Homes, Inc. v. Blake, Index No. 1563/88, Notice of Motion to Amend Answer
at 2.
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protected rights and incur legal expenses to defend herself. 14
Blake is suing for $5.1 million, which includes $5 million for puni-
tive damages "to punish and make an example of the Plaintiff and to
deter the Plaintiff and others from engaging in such conduct in the
future.",146
In any claim for abuse of process, the plaintiff must show that the
adversary has abused the court process to further an ulterior motive.
This cause of action is unlike a claim for malicious prosecution, in which
one has to show that the prior charge was resolved in one's favor. In an
abuse of process case, one is not required to prevail in the prior lawsuit.
One need only show that the process of the court has been perverted.
In an abuse of process case, the plaintiff may recover any actual
financial loss, and attorney fees and expenses if malice is shown.147
Defendants who find themselves the objects of these lawsuits and are
without the resources to defend themselves might consider turning to
established groups such as the National Resources Defense Council
(NRDC). Until recently, such groups largely confined their interests to
the nation's wilderness areas and other environmental issues. But in
1988, the NRDC opened its first urban law center in Manhattan, provid-
ing free legal advice to groups opposing real estate development. 4 ' In
addition, the American Civil Liberties Union has defended in some of
these defamation cases.
1 49
A second possibility is for insurance companies to offer coverage on
automobile or homeowner policies. Some policies currently do cover the
insured in the event of such suits.
150
C. Legislative Solutions
Perhaps the best remedy to deter these defamation cases from ever
being brought is to look to the legislature for a solution. The Gaffney-
Lavalle bill, introduced recently into the New York State Assembly, is
145. Terra Homes, Inc. v. Blake, Index No. 1563/88, Proposed Verified Answer and Coun-
terclaim, at 6.
146. Id. at 8.
147. Epstein, supra note 130, at 27.
148. Lueck, supra note 5. The NRDC said that one reason for its New York City initiative
was that "large law firms in New York are afraid of antagonizing the pity's powerful real estate
interests ....
149. The Suffolk County legislature in New York has established a $100,000 Citizen Legal
Defense Fund to deter such suits as those brought in SR WAssocs. and Terra Homes. Passed in
1985, the law is entitled, "A Local Law to Authorize a Legal Defense Fund for Citizens."
150. In Terra Homes, Inc. v. Blake, a portion of Betty Blake's legal costs was covered by
her auto insurer. In SRW Assocs. v. Bellport Beach Property Owners, only one of the 16
individual defendants was covered for his legal expenses as a defendant in the case.
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designed to discourage the kinds of lawsuits discussed in this Article
from being filed. It is called An Act to Amend the Civil Rights Law in
Relation to Requiring Proof of Actual Malice in Order for Certain Persons
to Recover Damages for a Libelous or Slanderous Statement in Certain
Circumstances.
151
The purpose of this proposed law is to require proof of actual malice
in an action for libel or slander brought by a plaintiff who has applied for
a license, permit, or lease from any government subdivision, and to limit
the plaintiff's right of recovery to actual monetary loss.
152
The Gaffney-Lavalle bill was introduced to protect individuals and
civic associations who found themselves subject to libel and slander suits
stemming from remarks made at public hearings and community and
civic meetings.
This bill would stem the tide of lawsuits having no merit other than
to silence opposition to projects. In introducing the bill, Representative
Robert J. Gaffney, its chief sponsor said, "Civic associations, public in-
terest groups, and concerned citizens have long been the watchdogs and
guardians of many communities. Without the protection offered by this
legislation, they will become ineffective." '153
The strategy behind this bill is to make those who file for licenses or
permits, or, in other words, those who are the potential plaintiffs, "public
figures" for purposes of libel law. Attaching this "status" to potential
plaintiffs would require them to prove "actual malice" on the part of
defendants before a recovery could be obtained.
The original Gaffney-Lavalle bill was debated in 1985 before the
New York Assembly, where it met with rigorous opposition from sena-
tors friendly to such interests as the New York Builder's Association.
These senators called the bill "evil."
15 4
During the Senate debate, one particularly vehement opponent of
the bill said, "This is a rotten bill. This is a very bad bill .... What this
bill, in effect, says is that you can go into [a] hearing, you can libel and
slander the permit applicant and unless he can prove actual malice by
clear and convincing evidence[,] . . .he is defenseless." ''
151. S-1081 A-1593, re-introduced January 19, 1989 (copy of Bill provided courtesy of
Representative Robert A. Gaffney). Both Rep. Gaflney and Senator Kenneth Lavalle spon-
sored this bill.
152. Telephone interview with Representative Robert A. Gaffney (Oct. 10, 1989).
153. Id.
154. News Release by Robert J. Gaffhey, 4th Assembly District (March 21, 1988) (cour-
tesy of Robert J. Gaffney).
155. Remarks by Senator Ryan to the New York Assembly, Senate Debate, June 26, 1985,
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The senator found the overbroad sweep of the bill particularly re-
pugnant. He argued that the bill would not just affect a large developer,
but "some small guy who wants to buy an apartment house; maybe a
duplex, maybe a three or four apartment building, one of which he wants
to live in."' 56 He also objected to the power that it would give to civic
associations or individuals, since:
Under the terms of this bill the neighbors can go out and say
practically anything they want relative to this development in try-
ing to stop it for whatever reason they might have; fear of what it
might do to their neighborhood, or whatever it might do to the
environment and they can be very, very negligent about coming up
with facts.
157
The Gaffhey-Lavalle bill has many flaws that would appear to un-
dermine its effectiveness as a deterrent to the bringing of defamation
suits. Perhaps a more efficacious solution would be a statute like that
proposed by a Libel Reform Task Force sponsored by the Annenberg
Washington Program of Northwestern University. This model statute
would protect flyers, newsletters, and statements disseminated by indi-
viduals and public interest groups."5 '
The model statute emphasizes retraction as a remedy, not dam-
ages.'5 9 The procedure in applicable cases would be as follows:
1. Within 30 days of the publication of the defamatory statement,
the would-be plaintiff would first demand a retraction or an
opportunity to reply before he or she could sue. The publica-
tion (or broadcast) could absolutely bar litigation by honoring
the would-be plaintiff's request within 30 days.
2. If the publication declines to retract, the issue could go to
Court. But either side could force the suit into a declaratory
judgment procedure. In this process, the only issue to be re-
solved would be whether the statement to which [the] plaintiff
objects is false.
3. After a trial, the judge would rule on this issue and make a
decision. The media-the original one [that published the ob-
jectionable statement]-then would be expected to print this
decision but the Court could not force them to do so. This
publication would restore either to plaintiff or defendants the
156, Id at 2.
157. Id at 3.
158. Smolla, A New Idea In Libel: No Cash, Just Truth, NEWSDAY, Mar. 3, 1989, at 81.
Such a bill was introduced into the Conn. Gen. Assembly, January 1989. Committee Bill No.
5932, "An Act Concerning Libel Reform."
159. In most of cases discussed in this Article, the plaintiffs sought multi-million dollar
damages from the defendants, which had an unnerving effect on all of those interviewed for
this Article.
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lost reputation. No retraction would have to be printed and
the loser would pay the legal costs of the opposition.
4. Even in the absence of a retraction or reply which would bar
the suit, the would-be plaintiff (developer) would face some
risks designed to force him to reconsider the wisdom of suing.
The declaratory judgment process would operate with a bias
toward protecting First Amendment rights. The burden of
proof on the plaintiff would be to show that the statement was
false by clear and convincing evidence. If [the] plaintiff does
not prove the case, he or she will have to pay the defendant's
attorney fees.1
6
Perhaps most significant is the fact that the model statute classifies
certain types of expression as protected. Options include fiction (Okun),
satire or parody (Terra Homes), letters to the editor (Walters, Karnell),
and editorial cartoons and political commentary.161 The list should in-
clude other types of statements, such as rhetorical hyperbole or charac-
terizations, that might appear in handbills or flyers.
Businesses such as those that brought suit in the cases described in
this Article would argue that this model statute is unfair because it im-
pinges on their right to seek money damages. Under this procedure, any
defendant would surely opt for the declaratory judgment process.
But a plaintiff may win at this stage, receiving the benefit of a speedy
decision to show that he or she was indeed the victim of defamation. In
such a case, the plaintiff will obtain attorney's fees. This is surely a better
situation than now exists, in which most plaintiffs lose their cases
eventually.
Under this model statute, the parties with meritorious claims will
likely win, which is as it should be. This law is certainly more effective
than the present system, and will succeed in weeding out "intimidation"
suits.
D. Practical Solutions
Individuals and civic associations in states with neither the appro-
priate legislative nor judicial remedies require guidance on how to protest
and minimize the risk of a lawsuit.
A common factor of the cases discussed here is the defendants' use
of inflammatory rhetoric, or, as some courts have termed it, "rhetorical
hyperbole," to advance their causes.
Individuals and associations should focus on the issues-the
problems raised by the proposed development: traffic, safety, pollution,.
160. Smolla, supra note 158.
161. Id.
[Vol. 17:503
water, and wetlands-as opposed to the mendacity of the developer. A
focus on substance instead of ad hominem attacks on the builder is a
safer, though not foolproof, course of action.
Any letters to the editor, handbills, fliers, and statements made at
hearings should be accurate and issue-oriented. In fact, the most prudent
course is for individuals and civic associations to consult with an attor-
ney before engaging in protest activities. Such a course may well be less
expensive in the long run because an attorney can advise on a course of
action that will avoid the inflammatory rhetoric and lawsuits.
In a sense, it seems that citizens should not have to engage in these
levels of protest to persuade public officials to enforce zoning rules. In-
deed, the people who have invested their lives in a community should
work for zoning rules and charter revisions that comport with the char-
acter of the community. Even more importantly, citizens should insist
that the municipal charter or governing document require that planning
and zoning board officials be elected, not appointed. This will assure
better responsiveness to the will of the community. 62
Conclusion
Whether the remedy comes from the judiciary or the legislature, ac-
tion must be taken to end this tyranny by lawsuit that has existed for the
past decade. As one author put it:
There is a strong belief that such suits are designed to scare off
the opposition, to clear the way of the developers to proceed
smoothly with their plans whatever the impact on the area in
which they are proposed. If that is true, we're all in a lot of trouble
because there would be no stopping the onslaught of development
for profit's sake, and the neighborhoods we enjoy would be de-
fenseless against questionable projects.163
There are things in life more precious than money. One is the com-
munity in which one has invested one's life and the lives of one's chil-
dren. Today, a person must invest a generation of work to purchase and
pay for a house. A home and a neighborhood is a lifelong investment.
Such a way of life should not be sacrificed to the vagaries of the legal
process nor to the greed of developers.
A balance must be struck between the right to bring an action for
defamation and the right to exercise one's first amendment rights. In this
162. Johnson, Concerns About Growth Raise Interest in Local Races, N.Y. Times, Section
12, Nov. 5, 1989, at 1, 12.
163. Willmots, Willmots and Why-Nots, Suffolk Life, May 29, 1985, at 4.
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collision, the first amendment rights of speech and petition inevitably
must prevail.
